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HAMMERING DOWN NAILS
The Freedom of Fringe Religious Groups
in Japan and the United States-Aurn Shinriky.5
and the Branch Davidians
Religious liberty in a democracy is a right that may not be
submitted to vote and depends on the outcome of no election.
A society is only as just and free as it is respectful of this
right, especially toward the beliefs of its smallest minorities
and least popular communities.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The true test of a country's freedom is how that country protects the rights
of its weakest and most unpopular minorities. A balance, however, between
public safety and protection of individual rights must be established. In most
countries, fringe religious groups often face prohibition and stigmatization by
those who practice the majority religion. Often, governments prevent the
abolition of religious intolerance and promote discrimination either overtly or
covertly.2 Ultimately, many fringe religious groups will confront that which
has been articulated in a Japanese proverb: "The nail that sticks up gets
hammered down."3
While both the United States and Japan constitutionally grant religious
freedom, both countries have experienced recent tragic events surrounding
fringe religious groups that caused lawmakers in both nations to reconsider
that freedom. Nevertheless, each country's response to those startling
incidents was quite different despite similarities in religious freedom.
Although Japan's Constitution was modeled after that of the United States,
Japan's guarantees of free exercise and separation of religion and state are
strict and detailed. Yet, the Japanese government responded to Aur
The Williamsburg Charter was drafted and signed in 1988 by a religiously diverse group
of representatives from many of America's faiths, including nearly 200 national leaders of
religion, politics, law, scholarship, and business. Signers included former Presidents Carter and
Ford, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and former Chief Justice Burger. See The Williamsburg Charter
(1988), reprinted in 8 J.L. & RELIGION 1, 8 (1990).
' See International Religious Freedom Act of 1998,22 U.S.C.A. § 6401 (1998) (finding that
"[mI]ore than one-half of the world's population lives under regimes that severely restrict or
prohibit the freedom of their citizens to study, believe, observe, and freely practice the religious
faith of their choice.").
3 DAVIDM. O'BRiEN &YAsuO OHKOsHI, To DREAM OF DREAMS: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN POSTWAR JAPAN I (1996).
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Shinriky6's sarin gas attack of a Tokyo subway with laws that increase the
power of the police and severely limit religious practices.
Paradoxically, since the 1993 confrontation with the Branch Davidians
outside of Waco, Texas,4 the United States federal government and the
legislatures of many states have been attempting to pass bills that expand the
freedom granted in the First Amendment and limit police power. The
conflicting reactions are due to differences between (1) Japan's relatively
recent granting of religious freedom and its communal tradition and (2) the
United States' long history as a haven from religious persecution and a
tradition that favors individualism.
II. THE RELIGIOUS FRINGE OF THE
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
Aum Shinriky6 is the fanatical religious group that on March 20, 1995,
released sarin, a deadly nerve gas, in a busy Tokyo subway.5 The incident
killed eleven people and injured thousands." The members of Aum who
released the gas were acting on behalf of the group's guru, Shoko Asahara, to
bring about his apocalyptic vision.7 To date, Aum Shinriky6 is the only
religion under active Japanese government surveillance, while the United
States State Department has designated the group as a terrorist organization
After this violent act, Japan reacted with a wave of governmental legislation,
police arrests, and the expansion of law enforcement's ability to wiretap and
utilize other surveillance techniques. Similarly, an anti-cult sentiment
pervades in the country. The aggregate effect is a clamping down on the
freedom of fringe religious groups in Japan.
While citizens of the United States are quick to point out what they view
as infringement onreligious freedom in other countries, the same distrust, fear,
' See Andrade v. Chojnacki, 65 F. Supp. 2d 431 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (noting that the Waco
confrontation was the deadliest law enforcement operation in American history).
I See ROBERT JAY LIFrON, DESTROYING THE WORLD TO SAVE IT: AUM SHINRIKYO,
APOCALYPTIC VIOLENCE AND THE NEW GLOBAL TERRORISM 3 (1999). For a timeline of the
events surrounding the Aura attack see Key Events for Japan 'sAun Supreme Truth Doomsday
Cult, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 30, 1999, available in 1999 WL 25115508; Russell
Skelton, Second Coming of the Doomsday Cult, AGE, Oct. 11, 1997, available in 1997 WL
23662463.
6 See LIFrON, supra note 5, at 3.
7 See id. at 3-10.
s 2000 U.S. DEP'T ST. ANN. RPT. ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: JAPAN, available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-ightsirf/irLrpt/irf-japan.htnl (released Sept. 5,
2000) [hereinafter ST. DEP'T 2000 RPT: JAPAN].
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and intolerance exists within the United States causing most people to have
little sympathy for fringe religions. Doomsday philosophy is hardly a
Japanese phenomenon, as is evidenced by America's more sensational cults:
the Charles Manson Family, Jim Jones' Peoples's Temple, Marshall Herff
Applewhite's Heaven's Gate, and the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas.9 The
sensational circumstances surrounding these groups may have bolstered an
anti-cult sentiment within the American mind that may stigmatize religious
organizations outside mainstream Judeo-Christian practices.
The media coverage of incidents involving the religious fringe in both
America and Japan portrayed these new movements in a similar light.
Discussions of new religions characterize such practices in terms of deviance
from the mainstream or as breaches of social norms.'0 The basic public
assumption by the mainstream is that groups like the Branch Davidians and
Aum are not real religions." Labeling such groups as "cults" (Japanese:
karuto) further marginalizes them from "legitimate" religions. In both
America and Japan, the term "cult" suggests "a deviant, fanatical group led by
a charismatic person who postures as a religious leader but who is in fact a
self-serving individual who beguiles people into following him or her, and
who manipulates and uses them for his or her own purposes."' 2
The initial Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) raid on the
Branch Davidian compound known as Mount Carmel was a concrete action
against a nebulous philosophy that deviated from the beliefs of the majority.
Controversy rages on as to whether the FBI used pyrotechnic tear gas to cause
the fire that resulted in the deaths of eighty Branch Davidians within the
compound. 3 Contrary to Japan, the United States has not enacted new laws
to control the activities of religious groups. Religious intolerance, however,
does exist through mainstream alignment with Christianity that cultivates fear
of unfamiliar philosophies, especially philosophies that encompass apocalyptic
beliefs that lead to an expectation of violence by the suspect group. Recent
9 See LIFTON, supra note 5, at 4.
Jo See IAN READER, RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: THE CASE OF AUM
SHINR KYO 226 (2000).
1 See id.
12 Id. at 226; see also AMERICANHERTAGEDICTIONARY 209 (3d ed. 1992) (defining "cult"
in terms of "obsessive devotion" to a sect considered "extremist" or "false').
13 See Terry Ganey & William H. Freivogel, Here is the Evidence Known sofar in Four Key
Areas of Special Counsel Danforth's Waco Investigation, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 7,
2000, at A9, available in 2000 WL 3507082; 60 Minutes: What Happened in Waco? (CBS
television broadcast, Jan. 25, 2000) (transcript available in 2000 WL 4212836).
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legislation proposed by federal and state governments attempts to address that
imbedded intolerance and protect fringe religious groups.
IlI. INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
A. United Nations Resolutions
As an expression of international law concerning the freedom of religion,
the United Nations ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article
18 in 1948.14 The Universal Declaration has been since expanded to include
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 18" and the
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimina-
tion Based on Religion or Belief.6 Article 2, section 2 of the Declaration
defines "intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief' as "any
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief and
having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms
on an equal basis.'
7
14 See Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, G.A. Res., 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/8 10, at
71 (1948) (stating "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance.") [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
's See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter International Covenant].
It states:
I. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or
belief ofhis choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such
limitation as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others.
Id.
"See Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55 (1981) (restating article 18 of International
Covenant) [hereinafter Declaration on Religion or Belie].
17 Id.
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The United States recently enacted these international agreements in the
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. " Noting that religious freedom
"undergirds the very origin and existence of the United States"' 9 and is a
"fundamental right,""0 Congress restated article 18 in its findings.2' The act
also provides for an annual report prepared by the secretary of the State
Department to detail the status of religious freedom around the world and
violations thereof." Violations of religious freedom "means violations of the
internationally recognized right to freedom of religion and religious belief and
practice, as set forth in the international instruments referred to in section
6401(a)(2)' of this title .... ."' This freedom to practice one's religion is
subject to limitations that "are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect
public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms
of others."'25
B. The 2000 State Department Report
In accordance with the International Religious Freedom Act, the United
States State Department annually examines the condition of religious freedom
throughout the world. In the 2000 report, the State Department divided
various countries' responses to religious freedom into five groups.' They
' See 22 U.S.C. § 6401 (1994).
19 Id. § 6401(aX1).
20 id.
22 See 22 U.S.C. § 6401(aX3) (1994).
22 See id. § 6412(a).
' See id. § 6401(aX2) (referencing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Helsinki Accords, Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, United Nations Charter,
and European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).
24 Id. at § 6402(13). It includes the following violations:
(A) arbitrary prohibitions on, restrictions of, or punishment for-(i)
assembling for peaceful religious activities such as worship, preaching, and
prayer, including arbitrary registration requirements; (ii) speaking freely
about one's religious beliefs; (iii) changing one's religious beliefs and
affiliation; (iv) possession and distribution of religious literature, including
Bibles; or (v) raising one's children in the religious teachings and practices
of one's choice.
Id.
2 International Covenant, supra note 15, at art. 1, § 3; Declaration on Religion and Belief,
supra note 16, at art. 12, § 3.
26 2000 U.S. DEP'T. ST. ANN. REP. ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,
availableathttp://ww.state.gov/wvww/global/huan.-.rights/if/irf-rpt/irf-exechtml (released
Sept. 5, 2000) [hereinafter ST. DEP'T 2000 Ryr: ExEcuTIvE SUMMARY].
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include the following: (1) totalitarian or authoritarian attempts to control
religious belief or practice;" (2) state hostility toward minority or non-
approved religions;28 (3) state neglect of the problem of discriminating against,
or persecution of, minority or nonapproved religions;2 9 (4) discriminatory
legislation or policies disadvantaging certain religions;30 and (5) stigmatization
of certain religions by wrongfully associating them with dangerous "cults" or
"sects."'" The last category regards governments that stigmatize new religions
through "sect lists" and governmental reports in order to control and monitor
them.32 It does not include overt religious intolerance such as the Taliban
movement's persecution and killing of Afghan Shi'as due to their religious
beliefs.33 Nor can this last category be likened to China's intolerance of
unregistered religious activity' or the jailing of members of the Falun Gong,
a meditative practice drawn from Buddhism and Taoism to promote health and
morality.35 This is, however, how world governments with constitutionally
granted religious freedoms block the promulgation and practice of fringe
religious groups.
The process of rnarginalization of religious minorities is particularly
prevalent when a fringe group believes in a doomsday philosophy-for
instance, the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas, and Au Shinriky6 in Japan.
In Japan and the United States, the process whereby minority religious groups
are denied religious freedom is (1) an unintentional governmental alignment
with majority religions, which results in (2) stigmatization of minority
religious groups and labeling as "cults" or "sects," meaning (3) that there
exists a subversive impairment of religious freedom despite affirmative
constitutional protection. This conclusion stands in contrast to the United
2 Examples include Afghanistan, Burma, China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam.
See id.
28 Examples include Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan. See i.
29 Examples include Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria. See id.
30 Examples include Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Eritrea, Israel, Jordan, Malaysia, Romania,
Russia and Turkey. See id.
3' Examples include Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, and Germany. See id.
31 See id. (citing Belgium, France, and Germany's parliamentary reports on new religious
groups).
33 See Ahmed Rashid, Afghanistan: Heart of Darkness, FARE. ECON. REv., Aug. 5, 1999,
at 8-12.
3' See ST. DEP'T 2000 Rnr: EXECurIVE SUMMARY, supra note 26.
3S See China Reportedly to Start Trial of Four Sect Leaders Tomorrow, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
25, 1999, at A5 (noting that government action was due to the threat the group poses to China's
Communist Party rule, especially in its members' practice of forgoing medical treatment).
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States and Japanese constitutions and to the United Nations declarations of
religious freedom. As a result, the governments of both countries need to
ensure that legislation does not interfere with the freedom of religion.
IV. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES
Religious freedom in the United States is granted by the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution. The First Amendment requires that
Congress "make no law respecting an establishment of religion" or "prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof."36 These two provisions are commonly known
as the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. While the
Establishment Clause has come to address government neutrality with regard
to religion and the prevention of apparent endorsement of or aid to a particular
religious activity, cases involving the Free Exercise Clause ask whether the
government has prevented free exercise of religious belief or can excuse
religious practices from the general law.
A. The Establishment Clause
In hearing cases under the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court
frequently addresses the issue of school prayer. In Lemon v. Kurtzman," the
Court established a three part test to determine whether government action
interferes with the establishment of religion. First, state legislation must have
a "secular legislative purpose";3" second, the principle effect of the legislation
must not advance or inhibit religion;39 and third, "the state must not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.'
36 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
37 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding state aid to nonpublic schools under
the control of religious groups unconstitutional).
38 Id. at 612.
31 See id. (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (validating a statute
requiring school districts to purchase and loan textbooks to students enrolled in parochial as well
as public and private schools)).
40 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)
(upholding a law that exempted an association organized and used for religious purposes from
property tax because it was not an attempt to establish, sponsor or support religion or an
interference with free exercise of religion)).
2001] 499
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
The issue over school prayer began with Engle v. Vitale,' which declared
state-composed school prayer unconstitutional. The Court stated:
When the power, prestige and financial support of govern-
ment is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the
prevailing officially approved religion is plain. But the
purposes underlying the Establishment Clause go much
further than that. Its first and most immediate purpose rested
on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to
destroy government and to degrade religion. The history of
governmentally established religion, both in England and in
this country, showed that whenever government had allied
itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable result
had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even
contempt of those who held contrary beliefs. '2
One year later, the Court extended its ruling in Engle by holding Bible reading
over the school intercom as unconstitutional. 3 Moments of silence in schools
have also been found to have a religious purpose and are therefore unconstitu-
tional." The Court held that a school official may not invite clergy members
to give prayer at school graduation ceremonies; however, prayer at graduation
may be permitted if it is student-initiated and student-led. 5
Most recently, the Supreme Court considered the issue of whether student-
led, student-initiated invocations prior to public high school football games
violated the Establishment Clause.' While the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit examined the case, President George W. Bush, then Governor of
Texas, joined the appeal of the lower court's ruling that the prayer was
unconstitutional."" Following the appellate ruling, which affirmed that the
"' Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); see, e.g., id. at 440 n.3 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(noting that from 1954 to 1956, the legislature appeared to blur the division between a true
separation of church and state as exhibited by the addition of a recognition of God to the Pledge
of Allegiance, currency and coins, and the national motto although such recognition had been
absent since the creation of this country).
42 Engle, 370 U.S. at 431.
41 See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
44 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
41 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
46 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
41 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Hear Case on Prayer at School Games, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 16, 1999, atA24.
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practice violated the Establishment Clause, the House of Representatives
passed a resolution on November 7, 1999 to pressure the Supreme Court to
overturn the lower court ruling and allow voluntary prayer at high school
sporting events. " Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the ruling of the lower
court as the policy lacked a valid secular purpose and was impermissibly
coercive.'
In contrast to the Court's efforts to prevent state endorsement of a
particular religion, religion returned to the forefront of presidential politics.
In the hotly contested 2000 presidential campaign, the candidates' religious
alignment came into the spotlight as candidates openly proclaimed their
Christian faith in the political arena. Three of the six Republican candidates
in an Iowa debate named Jesus Christ as their favorite philosopher-thinker.0
Furthermore, John McCain ran an advertisement in South Carolina publicizing
his composition of a Christmas sermon while in captivity in Vietnam.5' Vice
President Al Gore proclaimed in commercials that he studied religion at
Vanderbilt, and in a "60 Minutes" interview, he announced he was a born-
again Christian.5 2 Republican candidate Steve Forbes called for the posting of
the Ten Commandments in every classroom 3 in direct conflict with the
Supreme Court ruling holding such practice unconstitutional.~' Finally, Gore,
like President Bush, proposed that faith-based organizations might assist in the
distribution of government assistance to the needy." Either as a candidate's
attempt to mirror the view of the majority of the voting public or as an
expression of their personal views, religion's inter-involvement with
presidential politics may be further evidence of a dulling of the line between
religion and state. This alignment unquestionably demonstrates what the
courts and the Constitution have been attempting to prevent, namely
government identifying itself with a particular religion.
4 See id.
'9 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 290.
'o See Richard L. Berke, Religion Center Stage in Presidential Race, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15,
1999, at A20.
51 See id.
S2 see id.
" See Greenhouse, supra note 47.
'" See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
55 See Berke, supra note 50.
2001]
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B. Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution guarantees that
people may believe in anything, but religious conduct may be limited if it
violates general laws. In 1963, the Court announced that strict scrutiny was
to be the standard of review for laws that interfered with the First Amendment
right to free exercise of religion. 6 In Sherbert v. Verner 7 and Wisconsin v.
Yoder,5" the United States Supreme Court applied a "compelling interest" test
to determine whether a governmental regulation violated the Federal
Constitution's First Amendment Free Exercise Clause. Strict scrutiny involves
a two-part balancing test. It first demands that the individual show that
compliance with the condition imposed a substantial burden on the person's
ability to participate in religious observances. If so, the government then is
required to show it has a compelling governmental interest that justifies the
First Amendment infringement.59 Finally, the government is also required to
show "that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses
without infringing the First Amendment right."
Nevertheless, in Employment Division v. Smith,"' the Supreme Court
expressly abandoned Sherbert's strict scrutiny test that afforded safeguards to
non-mainstream faiths. The Court, in a 5-4 opinion, held that strict scrutiny
was inappropriate when examining the validity of a religion-neutral law 62 and
when the result would constitute "a constitutional anomaly." '3 Thus, the Court
held that under the free exercise clause, neutral laws of general applicability
might be applied to religious practices even if they are not supported by a
compelling governmental interest."
56 See Marianne C. DelPo, Never on Sunday: Workplace Religious Freedom in the New
Millennium, 51 ME. L. REv. 341,355 (1999).
" Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the state could not justify the severe
burden it imposed by denying unemployment benefits to an employee who was fired because
she refused to accept a job that required her to work on Saturdays, the day she observed
Sabbath).
'a Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
59 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-06.
60 Id. at 407.
61 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding Oregon's prohibition of the use
of the drug peyote in religious ceremony did not violate free exercise clause of the First
Amendment).
62 See Gary S. Gildin, A Blessing In Disguise: Protecting Minority Faiths Through State
Religious Freedom Non-Restoration Acts, 23 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 411,415 (2000) (holding
strict scrutiny applicable in very limited circumstances).
6 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886.
" Seeid. at 872.
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C. Waco: U.S. Response to Cultist Activity
In the 1930s, a religious group splintered from the Seventh Day Adventist
Church, ' settled in Waco, Texas and became known as the Branch
Davidians. s Joining the group in 1984, David Koresch soon became involved
in a struggle for control over the community, ultimately gaining power in
1988.67 Koresch began recruiting new members and consolidated the group's
operations into a fort-style compound outside of Waco, Texas, known as
Mount Carmel. He later renamed the compound "Ranch Apocalypse" in
1992." Central to his teaching was the dogma that the end of the world would
be brought by "the Beast," which he identified as agents of the government.
69
In addition, Koresch claimed to be a new Messiah and that all women
belonged to him, as he believed his role as a messiah made him the perfect
mate of all female followers.7'
In contrast to Japan's response to concrete acts of terrorism by Aum
Shinriky6, the Branch Davidians had not been charged with killing anyone
prior to the federal assault on their compound. Nevertheless, Japan's response
to Aurn paled in comparison to the use of force against the Branch Davidians
at Mount Carmel.7 While Aum's sarin gas attack was an outward expression
of this doomsday philosophy, the members of the Branch Davidians had not
acted out their beliefs regarding Armageddon until confronted by the ATF
agents.
's See ANNE DEVEREAUX JORDAN, THE SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS: A HISTORY 13 (1988).
Organized in 1863 by Ellen Harman White and James White, Seventh-Day Adventists hold
Saturday as the Sabbath, citing Genesis 2:1-3 and Exodus 20:8-11. The Adventists observe a
strict adherence to the Bible and believe in the Second Coming of Christ. Id. For a complete
background narrative concerning the Branch Davidians, see The Religious Freedom Page:
Branch Davidians (visited Feb. 1, 2001) <http://religiousmovements.lib.virginia.edu/nrms/
bran.html>.
" See William L. Pitts, Jr., Davidians andBranch Davidians: 1929-1987, in ARMAGEDDON
IN WACO: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE BRANCH DAVIDIAN CONFLICT 20, 20-21 (Stuart A.
Wright ed., 1995).
67 See id. at 37-38.
" See David G. Bromley & Edward D. Silver, The Davidian Tradition: From Patronal Clan
to Prophetic Movement, in ARMAGEDDON IN WACO: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE BRANCH
DAVIDIAN CONFLICT 43, 55-56, 61 (Stuart A. Wright ed., 1995).
69 See Andrade, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 442.
" See Bromley & Silver, supra note 68, at 58-59.
7' For a detailed outline of the events at Waco, see Andrade, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 441-46; see
also Jason Sullum, The Crackdown on Waco Impels a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 1, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Seapin File.
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Federal officials did, however, receive reports of child abuse arising from
the Branch Davidians' custom of marrying girls as young as twelve and news
that the group was manufacturing and stockpiling weapons. Consequently, the
ATF initiated a raid on February 28, 1993, which ended in the deaths of four
federal agents and six Branch members." The subsequent fifty-one day
standoff orchestrated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) resulted in
the deaths of an additional eighty Branch members and children from a fire
that consumed the compound.'
Following the arrests surrounding the events in Waco, a United States
District Court dismissed the claim by several members of the Branch
Davidians that the government violated their First Amendment rights to
religious freedom by enforcing various gun control laws against them." The
court applied the ruling in Smith to hold that the enforcement of gun control
laws applies to all individuals equally, regardless of their religious practices.76
Thus, because the law is not aimed specifically at a particular religion or
religions," "the fact that an investigation incidentally targets a specific
religious group does not render the investigation violative of the [F]irst
[A]mendment. " '
America's social and legal history grants special protection of religious
diversity. What occurred at Waco was an attempt by the government to
balance freedom of religious expression with the government's duty to
maintain social order; however, the events may have constituted an example
of the state interfering with the liberty of individuals to practice a particular
religion.79 The Davidians' status as a marginal religious group living in a
communal setting under a charismatic leader made them a more likely target
for investigation. Because members voluntarily relinquished personal freedom
to a leader who put forth apocalyptic beliefs, the Branch Davidians were
viewed as irrational and dangerous.* The regulation of firearms in society is
an important state interest, and any illegality by religious groups in the owning
7 See Andrade, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 442-43.
7 id.
7 Id. at 445-46.
7S See id.
76 See id.
n See Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
78 United States v. Allibhai, 939 F.2d 244, 250 (5th Cir. 1991).
7 See Rhys H. Williams, Beaching the "Wall of Separation ": The Balance between
Religious Freedom and Social Order, in ARMAGEDDON IN WACO: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
THE BRANCH DAVIDIAN CONFLICT 299, 300 (Stuart A. Wright, ed. 1995).
'o See id. at 315.
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and operation of firearms should not be granted special protection merely
because a religious group is involved." Nevertheless, the Davidians' status as
a liminal religious group exacerbated the situation and contributed to the
ATF's decision to investigate in the first place. 2 Therefore, the state's
concern was not merely motivated by the desire to regulate firearms but was
abetted by the group's status as a cult. Because the initial investigation may
have been facilitated by religious prejudice," the ATF action may have
violated the First Amendment's absolute prohibition of the government's
targeting of vulnerable and unpopular religious minorities in a way contrary
to how it would react to dominant religious groups."
In contrast to the burden of the state to show a "compelling interest," the
burden under Smith has shifted to the religious group to show that the
government action was directed at specific practices or groups with discrimi-
natory intent.85 The argument exists that a group of religious nonconformists,
a group which the Constitution specifically protects, were subject to harass-
ment by the state because of religion. As the ruling of Andrade demonstrates,
however, this may be very difficult to prove. In Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia
prophetically noted that fringe religions may have to turn to the legislative
process for protection of their practices.
D. The Post- Waco Battle Between Congress and the Courts
Ironically, during the same year as the Waco incident and in direct response
to the ruling of Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 (RFRA)." Scholars and religious groups became enraged when
the United States Supreme Court delivered its ruling in Smith. They argued
that this ruling would permit the government to infringe upon the religious
liberty of minority groups under the guise of representing the interests of the
majority 7 and accused the Court of disregarding what many believed to be the
sI See id. at 314.
82 See id. at 315.
S3 See id. at 316 (noting that the Branch Davidians had no history of threatening
nonmembers and no evidence existed that the group acquired weapons illegally).
" See Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Waco Tragedy: Constitutional Concerns and
Policy Perspectives, in ARMAGEDDON IN WACO: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE BRANCH
DAVIDIAN CONFLICT 323, 345 (Stuart A. Wright ed. 1995).
" See Williams, supra note 79, at 310.
"See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-bb4
(1993).
87 See Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise ofReligion Comes ofAge in the State
Court, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 235, 235 (1998).
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most important rights protected by the Constitution."8 Following Smith's
rejection of strict scrutiny, mainstream religions would not suffer an erosion
of religious liberty due to their political clout to prevent legislation that
offends their religious practices; however, minority faiths would be disadvan-
taged and victimized by laws not sensitive to their particular religious tenets: 9
"Religious minorities would be destroyed... [and] the devout would be forced
to choose between fidelity to their beliefs and bowing to Caesar."'9
Passing the RFRA in 1993 with near-unanimity,9 Congress directly
opposed the Court's holding in Smith.92 RFRA (1) had a purpose to "restore"
the compelling-interest test in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder; (2)
prohibited government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of
religion unless the government could demonstrate that the burden was in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and was the least restrictive
means of furthering that interest; and (3) made the RFRA applicable to all
federal or state law. 3
The United States Supreme Court struck down RFRA less than four years
after its passage. In City of Boerne v. Flores," a Texas Archbishop used
RFRA to challenge a zoning ordinance that prohibited him from expanding his
church.9 The Court dismissed the RFRA claim and declared the Act
unconstitutional, holding that Congress had exceeded the scope of its
enforcement power under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 6 The Court stated that Congress's power under
section 5 is "to enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment but "not the power to
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.' 7 The Court saw RFRA
as an expansion of the scope of rights under the First Amendment and not
merely an "enforcement" or "remedial" measure."6 Taken together, Smith and
Boerne may constitute the greatest threat to the survival of non-mainstream
ss See Mark J. Austin, Holier Than Thou: Attacking the Constitutionality of State Religious
Freedom Legislation, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1183, 1193 (2000).
'9 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890; Gildin, supra note 62, at 416-17.
90 Crane, supra note 87, at 235.
9' See Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Restoring Religious Freedom to the Workplace: Title VII,
RFRA andReligiousAccommodation, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2513,2522 (1996) (noting that the bill
passed the Senate by a vote of 97-3).
92 See id. at 2523.
93 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-bb4.
94 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
" See id. at 511-12.
96 See id. at 519-20.
97Id. at 519.
"8 See id. at 532.
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religious groups," as they permit government intervention iM religion without
demonstrating a compelling governmental interest.
The overruling of RFRA by the United States Supreme Court has initiated
two legislative responses that attempt to codify religious liberty: (1) individual
state RFRAs and (2) the federal Religious Liberty Protection Act ("RLPA").
A number of states have passed RFRA-like legislation in response to Smith.
Arizona, Florida, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
and Texas have enacted state RFRAs and many additional states have
introduced similar bills for consideration.'l° In California and New Mexico,
the legislature passed acts, but the governors vetoed the legislation.'0 1 As such
acts contain the same "compelling interest" test as RFRA, they are favored by
a diverse array of groups, from the American Civil Liberties Union to the
Christian Coalition. 2 Nevertheless, the states' religious freedom laws
exempting religious objectors from generally applicable laws unless the state
demonstrates a compelling interest cannot be obtained through less restrictive
means. 3 On one hand, it appears that such acts impose the strict scrutiny
standard without the reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment that doomed
RFRA. " On the other hand, although these statutes have not been tested, the
Court's language in both Smith and Boerne seems to indicate the Court's
9 See Gildin, supra note 62, at 413.
'o See id. at 433; Mary Jean Dolan, The Constitutional Flaws in the New Illinois Religious
Freedom Restoration Act: Why RFRAs Don't Work, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 153, 155 (2000)
(noting that 16 states had bills under consideration in the 1999 legislative session, and in 1998,
23 states had RFRA bills pending or in place); Steve Strunsky, In the Religious Wars, New
Jersey is Exhibit A, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 16, 2000, § 14NJ at 6 (noting that the New Jersey
legislature is presently considering one of their own); see, e.g., TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 110.003 (West 1999). It states:
(a) Subject to subsection (b), a government agency may not substantially
burden a person's free exercise of religion. (b) Subsection (a) does not apply
if the government agency demonstrates that the application of the burden to
the person: (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.
Id.
ION See Gildin, supra note 62, at 433-34.
'o See Polly Ross Hughes, StateSenate Gives OverwhelmingApprovalto Religious Freedom
Bill, HousToN CHRON., Mar. 16, 1999, at I, 9 (restating the language of the RFRA); see also
Scott Baldauf, Bolstering the Right to Worship, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 26, 1999,
at 1, 9 (noting that "[s]trengthening individual rights to worship would seem a no-brainer in
Texas, a place that folks like to call the 'buckle of the Bible belt.' "J.
103 See Huges, supra note 102.
"o See Gildin, supra note 62, at 433.
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desire to even strike down religious freedom legislation originating from
states.
105
Because recent incidents involving fringe religious groups have been
horrifying, one would expect the United States Congress to react with
legislation constricting the liberties of such groups. Nevertheless, in keeping
with the ideals of America's founding, Congress, prompted by states passing
RFRA-like statutes, has recently proposed another religious freedom bill. In
response to Boerne, the United State House of Representatives recently passed
the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999 ("RLPA").'o°
The Senate considered RLPA,' °7 which sailed through the House by a vote
of 306 to 118 . ° President Clinton promised to sign the bill,'09 but it stalled in
the Senate due to the same constitutional considerations that killed RFRA in
the Supreme Court."' The legislation enhances the protection of religious
exercise against the burdens of neutral state or local laws."' As Smith lowered
the standard of review for religious exercise claims, House Bill 1691 seeks to
replace the standard previously rejected by the Court in Boerne. Like the state
measures, the bill requires state and local officials, before imposing a
"substantial burden" on a religious practice, to prove "compelling government
interest" providing the burden is the "least restrictive means of furthering" the
government interest." 2 The bill, if passed, will certainly be challenged in the
courts due to its similarity to the 1993 law. While the Court deemed the 1993
measure over-broad, supporters claim that this bill is more focused. Conserva-
tives, however, hold that this legislation interferes with state and local
authority."' Surprisingly, under the strict scrutiny standard sought by
Congress, religious groups such as the Branch Davidians would find it easier
to get around religiously neutral laws as the burden would be on the govern-
ment to show a compelling interest.
"os See Austin, supra note 88, at 1197.
'06 See H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999).
107 See S. 2148, 106th Cong. (1998).
'o8 See Paul Leavitt, Religious Freedom Bill wins Approval in House, USA TODAY, July 16,
1999, at 5A.
'09 See John Cloud, Law on Bended Knee, TIME, Sept. 13, 1999, at 32.
"o See Baldauf, supra note 102.
"' See Christopher E. Anders & Rose A. Saxe, Effect ofa Statutory Religious Freedom Strict
Scrutiny Standard on the Enforcement of State and Local Civil Rights Laws, 21 CARDOzO L.
REV. 663, 663 (1999).
112 S. 2148, supra note 107, at § 2(A) & (13).
"3 See Glen Elsasser, House OKs bill restricting interference with religion, CM. TRIB., July
16, 1999, § 1, at 6.
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V. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN JAPAN
An examination of Japan's policy toward religion is incomplete without
some treatment of Japan's unique history, culture, and people. In contrast to
the West, in Japan, public rights of the group predominate over individual
rights." 4 To illustrate the communal nature of the Japanese, a story is useful.
Toward the end of World War H, in the city of Numazu, just south of Tokyo,
people emerged from bomb shelters to find their entire city flattened by
American planes. One house near the water remained and the lucky family
began to help others who were not so fortunate. Instead of accepting this
assistance, everyone gathered around the single standing house and began
throwing rocks at it until it was rubble like the rest-as if to say if one was to
suffer, all were to suffer." 5
Additionally, "despite constitutional provisions for individual civil rights
and liberties, such as freedom of speech and religion, such measures have
largely failed to take hold in postwar Japan."" 6 Religious intolerance arises
from a majority practice of a combination of Shintoism and Buddhism that is
equated with "Japaneseness" and a belief that other religious practices are
foreign. The Japanese religious tradition developed with the major sociologi-
cal and political changes in that country. Four major eras were instrumental
in Japan's religious evolution: the Tokugawa Shogunate, the Meiji Restora-
tion, the War Years, and the Modern Era."1
7
A. The Tokugawa Shogunate: The Solidification of "Japaneseness"
For over two hundred years (1600-1867) under the Tokugawa shoguns, all
doors to and from Japan were closed. In that time, the people of Japan, living
in relative peace, were able to cultivate and mold a culture that continues to
remain under every Japanese businessman's Western suit."8 The Tokugawa
"' For a complete examination of the communal nature of the Japanese people, see TAKEO
Doi, M.D., THE ANATOMY OF DEPENDENCE (John Bester, trans., 1973).
I"s Interview with Yukiko Ishikawa, Student at Numazu Higashi High School, in Shizuoka-
ken, Japan (1998) (speaking about her grandmother's house).
116 O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 30.
17 See EDwIN 0. REISCHAUER, JAPAN: THE STORY OF A NATION (3rd ed. 1981).
"a Hired by the Department of War to report on Japanese culture, Ruth Benedict interviewed
hundreds of Japanese-Americans forced to live away from the West Coast in camps during the
war. She was able, without ever setting foot in Japan, to write one of the most influential studies
of the Japanese people. See RuTH BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SwoRD 70 (1946)
(noting that Tokugawa Japan has left a strong impression on modem Japanese). For a detailed
examination of the Tokugawa Period see REISCHAUER, supra note 117, at 74-105.
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shoguns established a system whereby the emperor reigned but remained
isolated and removed from power. There was no religious freedom.
Buddhism was the established religion while Shinto, Japan's ancient,
indigenous folk religion meaning "kami way" or "way of the gods," was
assimilated into it."9
The Tokugawa ruled with an iron hand, maintaining control, safety, and
security through a meticulously plotted hierarchical system. During this
period, the motto of Japan took shape: "Everything in its place.' 20 Japanese
feudal society was based on an elaborate caste system that regulated all parts
of life including the clothes one could wear and the kind of house one could
live in. Below the Imperial family and nobles, the hierarchical order
progressed from the warriors (samurai), to the farmers, to the artisans, to the
merchants, and finally to the outcasts.'2 '
B. The Meyi Restoration
During the Meiji Restoration of 1868, not only was the emperor brought
back into power, Japan underwent a massive religious revolution as Shinto,
which had been assimilated into Buddhist practices during the Tokugawa
Period, separated and developed distinct practices."2 During the Meiji
Restoration, the Japanese embraced Shinto's myths and practices in an effort
to unite a people who had been fractionalized during the feudal Shogunate and
to legitimize the new Meiji emperor. '3 As the divine descendent of the Shinto
sun goddess herself, the emperor represented the union of Shinto and the
state.'24 State-sponsored Shinto, or State Shinto, predominated as an upholding
of the symbols ofnational unity and superiority. 15 In this respect, State Shinto
was beyond a Western notion of religious freedom. Because "it was concerned
with proper respect to national symbols, as saluting the flag is in the United
States, State Shinto was, they said, 'no religion.' ,,26 Additionally, during the
"9 See O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 33 (noting Buddhism priest prayed to Shinto "kami," or
gods under Buddhist names, while Buddhist rites were performed in Shinto shrines).
120 BENEDICT, supra note 118, at 87 (noting that "[s]o long as [the Japanese] stayed within
known boundaries, and so long as they fulfilled known obligations, they could trust the world."
at 70).
121 See id. at 61.
'2 See O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 35.
123 See id.
124 See id.
125 See BENEDICT, supra note 118, at 87.
12 Id.
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final years of the nineteenth century, government support of Shinto waned and
State Shinto was designated "nonreligious."'' 27 This downplaying resulted in
a degree of religious freedom as the government promoted Shinto as
"patriotism and civic responsibility.'
'
C. The War Years
In the years that followed, however, Shinto gained in significance, and "for
a brief and very oppressive period (from 1930 to 1945), State Shinto became
so pervasive that it became known as the "emperor system."'29 By the time
Japan entered into war with the West, Buddhism had been completely replaced
by State Shinto. 3 There was no religious freedom in pre-occupation Japan.
Emperor worship and State Shinto were "rigorously taught in schools,
perpetuated in propaganda films, and glorified in public ceremonies for the
cult of the war dead at Yasukuni, regional gokoku shrines, and local chdconhi
war memorials."''3 Indoctrination started early as schools taught "The Basic
Meaning of the National Policy (Kokutai no Hong).' ' 2 Teachers instructed
children that "[t]o give up one's life for the sake of the Emperor cannot be
called self-sacrifice. It is rather discarding one's lesser self to live in the great
Imperial Virtue, and exalting one's truer life as a national subject."'' 33 One
fought and died for the emperor, for each soldier was both a "shinka," or
vassal, and a "sekishi," or a baby of the emperor, as both servant and
biological extension.t31
In reaction to the pre-World War II period in which belief in Shintoism and
the divinity of the emperor influenced and increased feelings of militarism and
nationalism, the post-war Japanese Constitution of 1947 declared freedom of
religion to all.' 3  After the war, occupation powers demanded that the
127 See O'BREN, supra note 3, at 33.
128 Id. at 46.
129 Id.
00 See id.
13' Id. at 33. Gokokujinja means "country-protecting shrines, or shrines to defenders of the
country." Id. at 2. "'Chtlonhi' literally means 'memorial for loyal souls' or, more precisely,
'village memorial for the loyal souls of those who died fighting for the emperor.' "Id. at 5.
132 See id. at 47, citing the reprinted version in SHINTO: THE UNCONQUERED ENEMY 192
(Robert Ballow ed., 1945).
133 See id.
'34 See LIFTON, supra note 5, at 249.
... See KENPO, art. 20, para. 1, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD (Japan) (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1990) (declaring "freedom of
religion is guaranteed to all.").
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Japanese government abolish State Shinto, the national religion, due to its
connection with the Emperor, the government, and the nationalistic fervor of
the war." As sociologist Ruth Benedict noted, however, Emperor Worship
had not been what the occupation force envisioned: "It is said that when it was
suggested to the Emperor that he disavow his divinity, he protested that it
would be a personal embarrassment to strip himself of something he did not
have. The Japanese, he said truthfully, did not consider him a god in the
Western sense."' 37 Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, General Douglas
MacArthur, however, convinced the Emperor to do so in order to satisfy
international repute.'38 On August 15, 1945, in a radio broadcast, Emperor
Hirohito announced the end of the war.'39 It was the first time the Japanese
people had ever heard his voice."4 This signaled a new era of religious
observance for the Japanese people.
D. The Modern Era
Although the majority of today's Japanese do not consider themselves
followers of any religion, 4' Shintoism is still an important characteristic of the
Japanese cultural identity. Their lives "are intertwined with religious
observances-shrine festivals, 'god shelves' and Buddhist altars in the homes,
and Shinto or Christian marriages, Buddhists funerals, and other religious rites
of passage."'42 Japanese religious observances still pivot around Shintoism,
which has now become a ritualized practice of celebrating all "things
Japanese."' 43  In this respect, Shintoism in Japan today represents the
"patriotism and civic responsibility" that it did at the end of the nineteenth
century. Shinto rituals still center around the unique character of the Japanese
'36 See O'BREN, supra note 3, at 51 (noting that from the beginning of the Allied
Occupation, dismantling State Shinto was a primary objective).
1-" BENEDICT, supra note 118, at 309.
133 See id. at 309-10; see also O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 51 (recognizing MacArthur
considered Shinto "to be the main obstacle to establishing popular sovereignty, democracy, and
religious freedom").
' See O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 50.
140 See id.
'"" See Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi, 31 MINSHO 4 (Sup. Ct., July 13, 1977) in THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL CASE LAWOF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990 481, 483 (Lawrence W. Beer & Hiroshi Itoh
eds., 1996).
142 EDwIN 0. REISCHAUER, THE JAPANESE TODAY 215 (1995).
'4 See O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 16 (noting that Shinto has been described as a celebration
of"Japaneseness" or "Japanese uniqueness" (Nihonjin-ron)).
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and centuries-old myths and legends about natural phenomena such as
beautiful mountains, rivers, and trees.'"
Japanese engage in Shinto rites when they are participating in activities
particularly Japanese, such as Karate, Sumo, national holidays, and local
festivals. While most Japanese are cremated after death in Buddhist funeral
rites,' 45 Shinto rites are usually performed for worldly benefits and good luck
for activities such as passage of high school entrance examinations or for
prosperous businesses.' Babies are taken to local Shinto shrines for
blessings, kami shelves still exist in school martial arts gymnasiums, marriages
and coming of age ceremonies are also Shinto celebrations, and Shinto
ceremonies are still used to bless the construction of new civic buildings. 47
Every city, town, and neighborhood has Shinto shrines and festivals for the
kami or gods within those shrines. Consequently, it is undeniable that
Shintoism plays an important role in the lives of most modem Japanese. 48
E. The Rise of Post- War "New Religions"
Thus, Japan has aligned itself with a particular form of religion, Shinto, and
as people have recently become dissatisfied with the state, their ties to the
dominant religion have weakened. As a result, some Japanese have begun to
look to fringe religious groups such as Aum Shinriky6. 49 This trend has
continued and developed from the social, political, economic, and cultural
collapse of Japan at the end of World War II." Catering not to a Western
need for individual strength with God, new religions satisfy "the typical
Japanese need for a supportive social environment."'' The result is that new
religions like Aum have flourished in times of social disruption. Even in times
of relative calm, many Japanese who have a strong religious need today look
somewhere beyond mainstream religion. While Shinto and Buddhism are
more a matter of custom than religious belief, people moving away from those
established religions turn "instead to superstitious folk beliefs, prevalent
144 See REISCHAUE, supra note 142, at 207-08.
41 See O'BREN, supra note 3, at 16.
146 See id. at 19.
'47 See supra note 141, at 492.
,4s See REJSCAUER, supra note 142.
"9 See LIFTON, supra note 5, at 234 (discussing many commentators' blaming the rise of
Aum on the alienation and lack of meaning in the lives of Japan's youth, the legacy of the
emperor system, the strict educational system, or lack of personal autonomy in business).
"0 See id. at 236.
"'i REmSCHAunR, supra note 142, at 214.
2001]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
especially in rural Japan and among the less educated, or to a great variety of
popular religious movements, which are normally lumped together under the
name of 'new religions.' ,151
The most prevalent religions in Japan are Buddhism and Shintoism.1
3
According to the Agency for Cultural Affairs in 1998, 49.2% of Japanese
citizens adhere to Buddhism, 44.7% to Shintoism, 5.3% to "new" religions,
and 0.8% to Christianity."4 Nevertheless, these statistics are not mutually
exclusive as many Japanese will observe a combination of religious
practices.' Despite these statistics, participation in religious activities in
Japan is generally low by international standards. Edwin 0. Reischauer,
former United States ambassador to Japan, concluded "religion in contempo-
rary Japan is not central to society and culture."" 6 A 1996 Jiji Press Service
poll showed that 46.6% identified themselves with no religion, and a 1994 poll
indicated that less than seven percent of the population regularly attend
religious services."' This lack of participation in religion shapes the Japanese
attitude toward organized religion. The religious ambivalence evidenced by
the results of these polls suggests that many Japanese today are caught in a
wave of indifference toward religion; perhaps this indifference even inculcates
intolerance toward those who do profess strong religious beliefs."1
8
Conversely, the current apparent religious ambivalence in Japan might be
due to the fact that the only available word for religion represents notions of
non-Japaneseness. Questionnaires use the word "shfiky6" for religion. As
Japanese scholar Ian Reader points out, "shiiky6" "implies a separation of that
which is religious from other aspects of society and culture, . . . [and]
conjure[s] up notions of narrow commitment to a particular teaching to the
implicit exclusion and denial of others-something which goes against the
general complementary nature of the Japanese religious tradition." I 9
152 See id.
"' See ST. DEP'T 2000 RPT: JAPAN, supra note 8.
is4 Id.
Iss See FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: A WORLD REPORT 209 (Kevin Boyle & Juliet
Sheen eds., 1997).
'-s REISCHAUER, supra note 142, at 215.
"' id.
' See O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 21.
"9 IAN READER, RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 13-14 (1991).
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F. Religious Homogeneity Versus Heterogeneity
While the United States has been a country of religious and racial diversity
since its settlement by the British in the seventeenth century, Japan has
experienced centuries-old homogeneity and uniformity as one race with one
language living on one group of islands that has never been subject to
invasion." Many early Americans were religious dissidents escaping the
religious upheaval caused by the Reformation and Counter-Reformation,'
61
whereas Japan lay in deep isolation under the Tokugawa shoguns, solidifying
notions of Japanese distinctiveness. While several colonies in the New World
were established as havens for specific sects and denominations, other colonies
were experiments in establishing a new form of governance based upon
religious ideals. 62 This tradition of religious freedom and diversity in the
United States remains the foundation of current variations on religious belief.
On the other hand, although most Japanese have historically followed many
religious practices, they ultimately expect that others will worship in the same
ways and have the same attitude toward religion.6'
Because strong religious beliefs appear to most Japanese as foreign and
abnormal, people who abide by strong religious convictions stand out when
they refuse to contribute to local Shinto festivals and shrines.'" To the
Japanese, this refusal to take part in a communal activity is looked upon as
strange, uncivil, and non-Japanese. Believers of Christianity and Islam, both
monotheistic religions, often face harsh intolerance in Japan: "[I]f [monotheis-
tic religions] come into Japan without modification, and if the believers in
these religions refuse to show respect to the Buddhas and kami worshiped by
"6 Use ofthe term "invasion" would exclude the briefU.S. occupation following World War
II that restored Japanese sovereignty. It is interesting to note that although "kamikaze" or
"divine wind" had been the term designated for suicide pilots during the closing years of the
war, the word originated from the only serious threat of invasion that Japan experienced.
Genghis Khan amassed the largest naval armada in history to invade Japan; however, Japan was
saved by a "divine wind" in the form of a typhoon that destroyed the entire fleet.
161 See International Coalition for Religious Freedom, World Report: The Americas: The
United States (last modified Jan. 16, 2001) <www.religiousfreedom.com>.
162 See id. (citing examples of British separatists' founding of Plymouth Colony; Massachu-
setts and New Haven (Connecticut) by Puritans favoring a reform of the Church of England;
William Penn's Quaker experiment in Pennsylvania; and Maryland as a Catholic sanctuary from
Protestant England).
" See Koichi Yokota, The Separation ofReligion and State, in JAPANESE CONSTITUIONAL
LAW 205, 207 (Percy R. Luney, Jr. & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993).
'6 See id. at 207-08.
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others, [they] will encounter an extremely oppressive atmosphere.' 65 The
atmosphere that results is similar to what the United States State Department
describes as the promulgation ofreligious intolerance by social stigmatization.
In summary, unbending religions, especially non-mainstream religions, equals
"non-Japanese" in Japan, a virtual death sentence for an individual in such a
group-oriented culture.
VI. JAPAN'S CONSTITUTION
A. Separation of Religion and State
Japan is a democratic country with a modem constitution modeled after that
of the United States. The Japanese Constitution (Nihonkoku Kenpo, in part
drafted by United States occupying forces after World War II,'" provided a
firm foundation for freedom of religion as well as for the separation of religion
and the state. Four clauses make up the constitutional separation of religion
and state. The Japanese Constitution of 1947 states that: (1) "[n]o religious
organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any
political authority"; 6 7 (2) "[n]o person shall be compelled to take part in any
religious acts, celebration, rite or practice"; 6 (3) "[t]he State and its organs
shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity"; 69 and
(4) "[n]o public money or other property shall be expended or appropriated for
the use, benefit or maintenance of any religious institution or association.'
70
Despite the fact that both the United States and Japanese constitutions
provide for freedom of religion, the separation of religion and state under the
1947 Japanese Constitution is relatively narrowly defined compared to the
interpretative breadth provided by the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.'7 Nevertheless, Japanese courts have taken a lenient stance on
state involvement with religion.'72 For example, public funds are used to
preserve Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines as historic or cultural sites. 73
* Id. at 207.
'"See CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Japan), supra note 135, at 1.
167 KENPO, art. 20, para. 1.
68 Id. art. 20, pam. 2.
169 Id. art. 20, para 3.
170 Id. art. 89.
'1 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; KENPO, arts. 20, 89.
17 See Yokota, supra note 163, at 205.
73 See ST. DEP'T 2000 RPT: JAPAN, supra note 8.
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The Supreme Court of Japan 74 examined the separation of church and state in
a case in which a city used public money on a Shinto groundbreaking
ceremony for a public gymnasium. ' The court held that "an actual system of
government that attempts a total separation of religion and the State is virtually
impossible."' 76 The court also held that while the Constitution does not bar all
connection with religion, "it should be interpreted as prohibiting conduct
which leads to collusion between the State and religion only when such
activity exceeds reasonable bounds as determined with reference to the
conduct's purpose and effects."'1" Additionally, although the court found that
the Shinto groundbreaking ceremony was "undoubtedly a ceremony of
religious nature,"'17 it noted that its religious significance had weakened over
time so that people now saw it as a "secularized ritual without religious
meaning" and one of common practice in the construction industry.
79
In 1997, Japan's Supreme Court redefimed and limited this broad interpreta-
tion. The court held that articles 20(3) and 89 did not prevent a relationship
between religion and state that violates sociological and cultural norms. The
articles, however, did prohibit government actions, such as the contribution of
public funds to only one religious organization, if the action supported,
promoted, or interfered with religious activity.s ° In that case, the court found
that a prefectural government's donation of funds for offerings to a shrine
dedicated to fallen soldiers gave the impression that the government was
favoring one religious group over others and therefore was unconstitutional.'
Following that ruling, other cases arose that tested the limits of the
relationship between a religious group and the state. In one case, a prefectural
"4 For an overview of the organization and structure of the Japanese judicial system, see
Supreme Court ofJapan Home Page, <www.courts.go.jp/english/ehome.htm> (visited Feb. 5,
2000) (noting four lower courts below the Supreme: High Courts, District Courts and Family
Courts, and Summary Courts, which are all bound by the decisions of the superior court).
'" See Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi, 31 MINsHO 4, 533 (Sup. Ct., July 13, 1977) reprinted in
Constitutional Case Law of Japan, 1970 through 1990 478 (Lawrence W. Beer & Hiroshi Itoh
eds., 1996) (holding no violation of the constitutional separation of religion and state).
'76 Id. at 480
'77 Id. at481.
17 Id. at 482.
t79 Id.
18o See ST. DEP'T 2000 RPT: JAPAN, supra note 8; Sonni Efron, Offerings of Taxpayer Funds
at Japanese Shrine Barred, L.A. TIMEs, April 3, 1997, at A8; see also Kozo Mizoguchi,
Government Donations to Shrines ruled Illegal in Japan, AsSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 2, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 4860100; Church-State Divide Upheld: Japan's High Court Says
Government Can't Give to Shrines, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Apr. 3, 1997, available in 1997 WL
8353232.
181 See ST. DEP'T 2000 RPT: JAPAN, supra note 8.
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governor and two other government officials attended a similar ritual
ceremony. The Fukuoka High Court found that the activity did not promote
Shintoism and was a social courtesy within the realm of everyday life.
Therefore, the conduct did not violate the constitution."' In contrast, the
Kochi District Court ruled in July 1998 that the use of government funds to
repair Shinto shrines was equal to allocating public money to a religious group
and therefore unconstitutional.' 3 Additionally, in 1998, the Osaka High Court
ruled that the use of public funds by a municipal government in a grain-
offering rite in 1985 infringed the constitutional separation of state and
religion.'8 Presiding Judge Masahiro Iseki held that the payment of 4.88
million yen ($40,000) "gives to the general public an impression that the city
gives special support to the Shinto religion. [The city's] relationship with
Shinto exceeds the justifiable limit in view of Japan's social and cultural
conditions."'' 5
In an even more recent case, however, the Supreme Court of Japan in 1999
upheld the constitutionality of a municipal government's donation of 445,000
yen ($3,640) in public money to an association of bereaved families of war
dead. '" Unlike the 1997 Supreme Court ruling that state allocation of funds
directly to a shrine for war dead is unconstitutional, Presiding Judge Mot6 Ono
stated that although the association worships at Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine, the
main Shinto shrine for Japan's war dead, "[t]he group cannot be considered a
religious organization because specific religious activities are not part of its
original founding tenet.' 8 7 Ono found the group not to be a religious group
because it was not one organized to pray, worship, and spread its beliefs.'
As a result of the above rulings, the Japanese Supreme Court permits a
relationship between religion and state if it meets a two prong test: (1) the
relationship does not violate social and cultural norms, and (2) the state's
"2 See Japan: Court Rejects Suit on Religious Event, ASAHI SHIMBUN/AsAHI EVENINGNEws
(Japan), Sept. 26, 1998, available in 1998 WL 12789860; Court Favors Oita Officials in Shinto
Ceremony Row, YoMwIU SiM uN/DAELYYomIURI (Japan), Sept. 27, 1998, available in 1998
WL 12847054.
" See ST. DEP'T 2000 RPT: JAPAN, supra note 8.
See Court Rules Out Spending by Cities for Religious Rites, JAPAN POL'Y & POL., Dec.
21, 1998, available in 1998 WL 23198785; City Violated Constitution in Funding Rites, Court
Rules, YOMIURI SHiMBuN/DAELY YOMJURI, Dec. 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 21956972.
"' City Violated Constitution in Funding Rites, supra note 184.
"6 See Payment to War Dead Families Constitutional, JAPAN POL'Y & POL., Oct. 25, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 22841694; Court Declares Funding of War-dead Group Legal, YoM1uRu
SHIMBUN/DAILY YoMIURI, Oct. 22, 1999, available in 1999 WL 17758043.
"3 Court Declares Funding of War-dead Group Legal, supra note 186.
"'8 Id.
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involvement does not have the effect of promoting or interfering with a
religious purpose. The court will most likely have difficulty determining what
is permissible state involvement with religion due to the inter-relationship of
mainstream religions, Buddhism and Shintoism, with sociological and cultural
norms. For example, the court appears to permit some government sponsor-
ship of Shinto activities provided there is not the impression of state support
of a single religion. The state, however, rarely supports any religion other than
Shintoism and Buddhism.
B. Religious Corporation Law of 1951
Article 20 of Japan's constitution was modified with the passing of the
Religious Corporation Law of 195 1, " which requires religious groups to
register with the Ministry of Education (Monbusho), allowing them to obtain
the status of "religious corporation" (shtlcyJ h~jin) and qualify for tax
exemption.' 90 A religious corporation is defined as "a group or denomination
possessing facilities of worship whose objectives are to spread religious
doctrine, perform rites and religious ceremonies, and foster spiritual enlighten-
ment in its followers."' 91 The Ministry can refuse certification if it finds the
group to be involved in illegalities. Article 81(1)' of the law also empowers
a judicial court to dissolve a religious corporation that has clearly violated the
189 SHuKYO HOJINHO, Law No. 126 of 1951, reprinted in Yasuhiro Okudaira, Current
Controversies on the Control of Religious Organizations Japan, 10 COLUM. J. AsIAN L. 127, at
132 n.21 (1996) [hereinafter Religious Corporation Law].
190 See Thomas Leo Madden, 7he Dissolution ofAun Shinri Kyo as a Religious Corporation,
6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 327, 330-32 (1997) (noting that the law's purpose is secular as stated
in Religious Corporation Law § 1(1): "to accord legal capacity to religious groups in order to
help such groups maintain and operate institutions of worship and other property, or to allow
such groups to manage business affairs in order to achieve their objective of owning such
institutions and other property").
19' Id. at 331 n.26 (quoting Religious Corporation Law § 2).
1 See Religious Corporation Law, supra note 189, § 81(1), which reads as follows:
When the court recognizes one of the following conditions fulfilled by a
religious corporation, . . the court may order to dissolve that corporation:
1. when there is clear evidence that a corporation has given serious harms to
the public welfare by violating law.
2. when a corporation has behaved itself considerably inimical to the purpose
of a religious organization as provide in Article 2 of this law, or when a
corporation has done nothing with respect to the said purpose for more than
one year.
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law, conspicuously injured the public, and exceedingly deviated from its
religious purpose. 93
C. The Religious Corporation Law Used to Disband Aum
Immediately following the sarin gas attack, Japan applied the Anti-
Subversive Activities Law of 1952's and the Religious Corporation Law of
1951 ' to strengthen governmental control of religious organizations. Aum
escaped being outlawed under the Anti-Subversive Activities Law because a
panel ruled that there was no reason to believe the cult could still be a threat
to society.'" The Japanese Supreme Court formally dissolved Aum Shinriky6
under Section 81 of the Religious Corporations Law due to its role in the
production and dissemination of the sarin gas used in the Tokyo subway
attack.' 97 Even considering the spiritual and religious impact on the rights of
innocent followers, Aum Shinriky6 "clearly violated the law in a way that
profoundly endangered the public welfare and engaged in behavior signifi-
cantly deviating from the objectives of a religious organization."' As a
result, their actions violated sections 81(1) (i) and 81(l)(ii-first half) and
therefore constituted grounds for dissolution. 99
The court found that the purpose of the Religious Corporation Law "deals
exclusively with the secular side of the organization and in no way deals with
the spiritual or religious side. It does not purport to interfere with any exercise
of the right to freedom of religion, such as the religious activities of
believers."200 Therefore, even if the court dissolves a religious corporation,
followers can continue their participation in the religious organization absent
its corporate status. "°1 As a result, Aum officially renamed itself "Aleph" in
February 2000 and continued to exist as an organization without keeping its
distinction as a religious corporation. 2
"' See Madden, supra note 190, at 333 (citing Religious Corporation Law § 81(1));
Okudaira, supra note 189, at 132-33.
'9 HAKAI KATSUDO BOSHIHO, Law No. 240 of 1951 [hereinafter Anti-Subversive Activities
Law].
19S Religious Corporation Law, supra note 189.
' See Madden, supra note 190, at 333.197 Id. at 327.
'" Aur Shinriky6 v. Doi, 900 HANREi TAIMUZU 160, 163-66 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 30, 1996)
reprinted in Madden, supra note 190, at 344-54, 353.
'" See Religious Corporation Law, supra note 189.
200 Id. at 352.
201 See id.
202 See ST. DEP'T 2000 RPT: JAPAN, supra note 8.
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VII. THREATS TO FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION IN JAPAN
A. The 1996 Religious Corporation Amendment
After the repression of religions by the Japanese government in the first
half of the twentieth century, the general assumption had been that religious
movements need to be protected in modem society. 3 After the Aur incident,
however, governmental debate centered on whether laws needed to be
amended to allow the state greater surveillance and control over religious
groups.' According to the 1996 and 1997 United States State Department
Reports on Human Rights, until 1996, registration under the Religious
Corporation Law was little more than a formality and almost all groups
registered.2 5 Embarrassed, however, by the Aur Shinriky6 1995 sarin attack
coupled with a growing public distrust of religious organizations,2 "4 the
Japanese government passed the 1996 amendment to the Religious Corpora-
tion Law, requiring religious groups to submit lists of property, executive
members, and accounts.20' The Religious Corporation Council (Shtlcydhiyin
shingi-kai)2" suggested amendments to the law in order to bring the Religious
Corporation Law in line with social developments.' The legislature passed
the Advisory Council on Religion's three points to be amended: "(1)
modification of the Public Safety Review Commission'sjurisdiction; (2) a new
system of keeping records of each corporation; and (3) the right of access to
203 See READER, supra note 10, at 225.
204 See id.
2o See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, JAPAN REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1997
(released Jan. 30, 1998) <www.state.gov/www/global/human.rights/1997_.hrpreport/japan.
html>; U.S. DEP'TOF STATE, JAPAN REPORTON HUMAN RIGTS PRACICES FOR 1996 (released
Jan. 30, 1997) <www.state.gov/www/global/human-.rights/l 996_Jhrpreport/japan.htm>.
' See Religious Bodies Need to Boost Transparency, YOM1URI SHIMBUN/DALY YOMIURI,
Aug. 25, 1999, available in 1999 WL 17756616 (discussing a recent Yomiuri Shimbun poll that
found 40 percent of the respondents had negative images of religious groups, citing secrecy and
financial problems).
207 See id.; ST. DEP'T 2000 RPr: JAPAN, supra note 8.
208 See Madden, supra note 190, at 356 n. 141 (defining The Religious Corporation Council
as a "deliberative council made up of religious leaders and scholars whose role is to assist the
Minster of Education in matters relating to the administration of the Religious Corporation
Law"); see also Okudaira, supra note 189, at 136-38 (noting that while the usual process is the
Ministry of Education submits proposed amendments to the Council of Religious Corporation,
for this Amendment, Prime Minister Murayama initiated the proposed amendment, the Ministry
of Education met with the Council, and only months later (contrary to the expected three year
or more deliberation period), the Advisory Council submitted its final report).
209 See Okudaira, supra note 189, at 136-38.
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a corporation's documents by its members.' '2 ° This amendment places
oversight of religious corporations that operate within more than one
prefecture"' under the Ministry of Education (Monbusho) rather than
prefectural governors.212  The result is a shift from localized to national
control, as Monbusho is now able to review not only financial reports of
religious organizations but also information concerning membership,
programs, and activities. The most drastic change, therefore, is that authorities
are empowered with more oversight of the groups:
First, a religious corporation is obligated to submit annually
to the authorities a copy of the documents it is required to
maintain in its office under section 25(2) of the Law....
Secondly, an entirely new provision was added to the Law
giving the authorities the power to question members of a
religious corporation and collect information from a religious
corporation under certain prescribed circumstances.1 3
In addition, the power to disband religious corporations is in the hands of
Monbusho. Finally, the amendment allows any person adversely affected by
members of a religious group to request a review of financial or other
documents.
B. Criticism of the Religious Corporation Amendment
With the passing of this amendment, Japan began a process of placing
further restrictions on religious freedom. While the United States has
experienced attempts to expand religious freedom through legislation that
imposes the strict scrutiny standard, Japan has limited individual religious
practices for the public good. Many Japanese are concerned about the recent
policies enacted to control religious freedom in Japan in the wake of the
subway gas attack. There is apprehension that the expansion of state power in
210 Id. at 138.
211 "Prefectures" are geographic and governmental entities that may be compared to "states"
in the United States.
212 See Revised Religious Law to Affect 544 Organizations, JAPAN POL'Y & POL., Sept. 16,
1996, available in 1996 WL 7593634.
213 Madden, supra note 190, at 357. The authorities may exercise power when sufficient
reason to believe that cause exits "(1) to suspend profit-making activities; (2) to rescind the
certification of incorporation; or (3) to dissolve the corporation pursuant to section 81(1)(i)-
(iv)." Id.
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the amendment to the Religious Corporation Law may erode Japan's
commitment to religious freedom. Critics believe a more appropriate response
to the Aum Shinriky6 attack would have been to improve Japan's anti-
terrorism security and to use provisions that already exist to handle terrorist
activity. Additionally, critics have likened the recent legislation to the
draconian tactics of Japan's totalitarian regime of the 1930s that led the
country into war.
214
By late August 1999, the Japanese government expected to fine more than
1000 religious organizations for failing to submit documents to authorities as
required by the revised Religious Corporation Law.25 A fine is imposed on
groups that fail to produce the required documents.2t6 The most surprising
response has come from the Kyoto Buddhist Association, comprised of about
1000 temples,2 7 which requested that its members disregard the law due to
perceived governmental interference with the constitutional grant of freedom
of religion.2
18
The reason for the recent fines, according to the Cultural Affairs Agency,
was that approximately 5000 religious groups appear dormant 9 and that the
government felt that some of these groups may have been used for tax
evasion.2 ° Furthermore, the Mastuyama District Court ordered the first
dissolution of a dormant religious group since the Religious Corporation Law
was ratified in 1951.22' These government actions show the immediate
effectiveness of the 1996 Amendment in heightening the monitoring of
religious practices within Japan.
214 See Nicole Gaouette, Japanese Suburbanites Defy Law, CHISTAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
Sept. 28, 1999, at 5.
2s ReligiousBodiesNeedto Boost Transparency, supra note 206 (citing that only twelve out
of the total forty-seven prefectural governments received documents from all religious groups
while approximately 400 refused to submit documents in Kyoto Prefecture, 300 refused in Osaka
Prefecture, and more than 200 failed in Aichi Prefecture).
216 See id.
"1 Including such national symbols as Kinkakuji, Ginkakuji, and Kyomizudera.
21 See supra note 206.
2'19 See ST. DEP'T 2000 RPT: JAPAN, supra note 8.
' See International Coalition for Religious Freedom World Report: Asia/Pacific: Japan
(last modified May 5, 1999) <www.religiousfreedom.com>.
22 See ST. DEP'T 2000 RFr: JAPAN, supra note 8.
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VIII. COMMUNITY REACTION TO THE
RECENT RESURGENCE OF AUM
Although the Religious Corporation Law was applied to Aum Shinriky6 to
dissolve it officially in 1996, group membership has grown recently, causing
the government to take an increasingly offensive position to suppress the
activities of its members. The organization's principal facilities have been
closed and its guru imprisoned. m From October 1999 through mid-2000, the
Tokyo District Court sentenced to death four of the five senior cult members
involved in the sarin gas release.m Cases are still pending against other Aum
members, including that of Shoko Asahara. 4 In March 2000, the Tokyo
District Court ordered the cult to pay 688 million yen ($5.6 million) to
survivors and the families of those killed in the attack.' Despite this, Aum
has earned more than seven billion yen ($64 million) in computer sales in 1998
alone and still has an estimated 2000 followers, down from 10,000 in 1995,
and forty places of operation.226
Recent years have seen the growth of an "anti-cult movement" in both the
government and the Japanese public in reaction to Aum's ending a period of
inaction. Members of the Unification Church and Jehovah's Witnesses have
alleged that police do not enforce laws against kidnapping when church
members are held against their will and forcibly deprogrammed.2 7 The Diet
considered this complaint in April 2000, but the national government took no
action.m With regard to Aum, people who live near cult members have been
growing uneasy 9 and thousands of protesters have taken to the streets to
demand the eviction of Aum members. ' ° Local governments have refused to
register Aum followers as residents.f' Without a residency permit, a Japanese
2 See also Jonathan Watts, Cult Plans a Timely Change ofImage, GuARDIAN (London), Jan.
17, 2000, at 15 (reporting that Aum has renounced its leader Asahara and claims that only senior
members of the cult will retain only a skeleton organization of operation).
"3 See ST. DEP'T 2000 RPr: JAPAN, supra note 8.
22 See id.
See id.
See Michiya Murata, Aum Fills a Spiritual Need, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 19, 1999, available
in LEXIS, News Library, itimes File; ST. DEP'T 2000 RPT: JAPAN, supra note 8.
227 See ST. DEP'T 2000 RPT: JAPAN, supra note 8.
22S See id.
2' See Calvin Sims, Still Furious at Cult, Japan Violates Its Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,
1999, at Al.
' See Thousands Rally Against Japan's Doomsday Cult, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug.
8, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2651053.
231 See ST. DEP'T 2000 RPT: JAPAN, supra note 8; Gaouette, supra note 214 (relating the
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citizen cannot receive medical care, health insurance, pensions, or other public
services like drivers' licenses and voting rights. 32 In addition, public schools
and parks have refused to permit entrance of children of cult members. 3
Some Aur followers are being denied the right to enter businesses or
restaurants.23' Furthermore, a growing number of cities in Japan are using
public money to buy property owned by the cult.235 Additional cities are
considering using tax funds to pressure Aum members to move elsewhere.236
Nevertheless, the Japanese national government has made some strides in
attempting to counter this movement. On one hand, in February 2000,
Monbusho asked Saitama prefecture officials to reverse their decision
prohibiting children of Aurm members from attending public elementary
school.2" On the other hand, in 2000, the national government did not prevent
local school administrators in Ibaraki and Tochigi prefectures from blocking
the registration of three children of Aum leader Shoko Asahara. 3s
IV. THE CURRENT WAR BETWEEN RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN
JAPAN: THE WIRETAPPING BILL AND THE AMENDMENT
TO THE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES ACT
To counter the growth of Aum's activities, the Japanese government has
reacted with a wave of legislation. Along with the passing of the amendment
to the Religious Corporation Law, the Japanese government has recently
passed legislation to further increase the transparency of religious groups and
to expand police power in the monitoring of those groups.
example of the mayor of a Tokyo suburb and 35 other mayors who refuse to allow Aura to live
in their towns, violating the constitutional guarantee of living where one likes).
232 See Gaouette, supra note 214.
, See Editorial, Cruel Crackdown: Japanese Cities Try to Ostracize Cult Members,
PrrTSBURGH POST-GAZETtE, Sept. 15, 1999, available in 1999 WL 25690861.
234 See id.
23s See Calvin Sims, Japan Cities Buy Property to Keep Cult Member Out, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Sept. 30, 1999, available in 1999 WL 4090446 (noting a recent Kyodo, Japan's
leading news service, survey that four municipalities have spent a total of approximately S 1.4
million in recent month to buy property); see also 4 Municipalities Pay 153 mil. yen to Expel
Aum Cult, JAPAN POL'Y & POL., Sept. 13, 1999, available in 1999 WL 22841354.
236 See Sims, supra note 235.
237 See ST. DEP'T 2000 RPT: JAPAN, supra note 8.
238 See id.
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A. Wire Tapping and Expansion of Police Power
In August of 1999, the Japanese government passed three bills into law,
including one to allow wiretapping in certain investigations.! 9 The law allows
law enforcement agencies, after obtaining a warrant from a district courtjudge,
to wiretap private communication for the investigation of crimes involving
drugs, guns, murders committed by groups, and the mass smuggling of people
into Japan.24 Passing by a vote of 142 to 99,"4 this controversial bill
threatened to tear the legislature apart. u2 While the government argued that
this legislation would be a major weapon against organized crime, such as
Aum Shinriky6 or the Japanese mafia (yakuza), there are concerns that the
legislation could infringe on individual rights of privacy.24 3 One such
allegation arose when, in September 1999, Jehovah's Witnesses claimed that
police were maintaining surveillance of church activities.' The government,
however, has denied that it monitors that group or other recognized religious
groups.245
B. The Anti-Subversion Act and Amendment
The Anti-Subversive Activities Law (Hakaikatsudo boshiho orHaboho),2"
a previously unused law passed in 1952, was modeled after Senator
McCarthy's United States Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950247 and has
the similar purpose of controlling the activities of the Japanese Communist
'39 See Diet Enacts WiretappingLegislation, JAPAN POL'Y & POL., Aug. 16, 1999, available
in 1999 WL 22841150 (the other two bills are unrelated to wiretapping: one revises criminal
procedure to protect witnesses in criminal trials, and the other provides for stricter punishment
for organized crime and expands penalties for money laundering); see also Editorial, Apply
Wiretap Law the Right Way, YoMIuIm SHIMBUN/DAILY YOMItR, Aug. 13, 1999 available in
1999 WL 17756350 (stating that the law, passed on August 12, 1999, limits wiretapping to cases
in which there is a strong suspicion that crimes will be committed and no other investigative
methods are available).
' See Diet Enacts Wiretapping Legislation, supra note 239.
241 See id.
242 See Anxiety About Wiretapping, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 1999, at 16.
14 See id.
' See ST. DEP'T 2000 RPr: JAPAN, supra note 8.
14 See id.
See READER, supra note 10, at 224.
247 See Matthew H. James, Keeping the Peace-British, Israeli, and Japanese Legislative
Responses to Terrorism, 15 DicK. J. INT'L L. 405, 443 (1997) (stating that while the act can be
used to suppress any terrorist organization, the defendant must be affiliated with a subversive
organization); Okudaira, supra note 189, at 146.
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Party."4 The predecessor of the act was the Organization and Other Activity
Regulation Ordinance of 1949 that regulated "any organization which had
attempted to resist or oppose the authority of the occupation powers, or to
assist or justify any policies of overthrowing the governmental scheme by
violence."24'
The act seeks to control both organizations and individuals who engage in
"subversive activities by violence" as defined in article 4 of the law." ° The
definition can be broken down into two categories: the first includes such
crimes as rebellion, insurrection, or treason; and the second includes "regular
crimes defined by the criminal code... committed with special motivations"
like political intentions.2' Nevertheless, the language of the act limits its
application to situations in which there is a danger that the group will continue
to repeat subversive activity in the future. 5'
Upon a finding of a violation of the act, the accused group would not be
able to take part in any spiritual practices, produce materials advocating the
group's beliefs, or actively proselytize their faith. 3  Therefore, Aum, while
stripped of it religious corporation status, would not even be allowed to
continue to exist in any form whatsoever if convicted under this statute. Due
to this drastic restriction on the practice of religion, the act has been en-
shrouded in controversy for being an infringement "upon the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech, and critics have warned against possible
infringement of the right to freedom of religion."
Aum escaped being disbanded under the pre-existing act because a legal
panel ruled that the group no longer posed a threat to society.2" It is
significant to note that the Japanese government had never invoked the control
of the law before the Aur Shinriky6 incident.' The investigations made by
249 See READER, supra note 10, at 224.
249 Okudaira, supra note 189, at 145-46 (noting that the act gave occupation powers the
authority to purge militarists and ultra nationalists and "deprive communist members of their
Diet seats").
"0 See id. at 147.
2s' Id.
2s2 See id.
211 See READER, supra note 10, at 224.
2 James, supra note 247, at 444.
25' See Madden, supra note 190, at 358-60 (citing the January 31, 1997, Public Security
Examination Commission's rejection of the government's request to ban the group under the
Subversive Activities Prevent Act); Religious Corporation Law, supra note 189, at 147; Koichi
litake, Japan: NewLegislation to TargetAwn Shinrikyo, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Japan), Sept. 9, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 17700529.
256 See Religious Corporation Law, supra note 189, at 148.
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a committee set up to judge this issue found that "(1) due to a shrinkage of its
personnel, material, and financial assets, Aum had been significantly
weakened, and (2) the group had made the transition from a cloistered and
secluded religious organization to one that is now safely dispersed throughout
society. '
257
Nevertheless, Auni recently ended a period of inactivity by expanding its
presence nationwide. In response, the government introduced a bill as an
amendment to the Anti-Subversion Law in order to limit the group's activities
and to make it easier to disband Aum and other groups." 8 Although the bill
does not mention Aur by name, the proposed legislation is being referred to
as the "Aur control law" because Auma is the only group that currently
qualifies under the legislation. ' 59
Both the Diet and the Cabinet approved the controversial law, which went
into effect on December 27, 1999.m With the planned law, the government
hopes to conduct on-site inspections of groups that have committed indiscrimi-
nate mass murder in the past. The law gives the Public Security Investigation
Agency ("PSIA"), under the Justice Ministry,261 the right to raid cult facilities
without a search warrant, to unilaterally evict groups from their property, and
to seize assets of members to compensate victims.262 Every three months
during a three-year supervisory period, the suspect group must provide
information about its members and the nature of their activities.263 In addition,
law enforcement officials shall monitor the group's activities by making them
submit reports and reveal their findings to the public." As punishment for
failure to comply through interference with inspection, members could face
fines, imprisonment, and confiscation of land."5
Although the law met opposition from religious groups including the Soka
Gekkai, the nation's largest lay Buddhist group and a strong supporter of New
' Madden, supra note 190, at 360 (noting further that the commission believed the group's
movements should continue to be monitored and a plan should be implemented to integrate Aur
followers back into society).
... See Bill Set to Curb Groups Tied to "Indiscriminate" Murders, JAPAN TIMEs, Nov. 3,
1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Jtimes File.
s9 Apocalypse Tomorrow?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 1999, at 37.
o See Valerie Reitman, Japan's Law on Sects Spurs Debate, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16,2000, at
A20.
2 See Bill Set to Curb, supra note 258.
2 See Reitman, supra note 260.
m3 See Bill Set to Curb, supra note 258.
2 See Iitake, supra note 255.
26 See id.
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Komeito, the opposition party,2" legislators are confident that the bill is
constitutional. In support of the bill, legislators cite the expressed limits
placed on authorities not to unreasonably restrict people's basic rights
guaranteed by the constitution. 7 On the other hand, the expanding power of
the PSIA to instigate surveillance of such groups has come under attack due
to the revelation that three years ago, the PSIA issued orders to monitor a long
list of citizen action groups and other private organizations of writers and
journalists.'" 8 Interestingly, amidst the current debate, Aum has reacted by
dissolving itself and renouncing its leader Asahara in order to evade the
legislation. 69 The group has also changed its name to "Aleph.9270 By
changing its identity, Aum hopes to circumvent the law, but this is unlikely
due to a swing of public opinion against Aum.27'
X. CONCLUSION
Two countries with constitutionally granted freedom of religion have had
polar reactions to acts of violence surrounding two fringe religious groups,
Aum Shinriky6 and the Branch Davidians. In contrast to the Japanese
government's response to its own crisis with fringe groups, the government of
the United States has reacted with legislation to expand individual rights of
worship while limiting the power of the government to police those rights.
These conflicting responses are inextricably tied to the differences in the
events each country experienced. On one hand, the sain gas attack by Aum
Shinriky6 directly invaded the rights of the public, and the Japanese govern-
ment reacted by sharply limiting the individual rights of those with stronger-
than-average religious views. Consequently, the legislature strengthened the
state's ability to maintain public order at the expense of religious liberty. In
doing so, the Japanese government is making every effort to hammer the nails
that may stick up. The raid on Mount Carmel in Waco, on the other hand, was
a direct invasion by the United States government on individual rights. The
United States legislature and assemblies of various states sought to empower
266 See id.
167 See id.
2 See Citizen 'subversives'in our midst?, JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 2, 1999, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Jtimes File.
269 See Jonathan Watts, Cult Plans a Timely Change oflmage, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 15,
2000, at 15 (noting that to be convicted under the act, the group's leader must still control his
or her members).270 See ST. DEP'T 2000 RPT: JAPAN, supra note 8.
271 See id.
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religious liberty against state interference. Thus, government is attempting to
preserve atypical nails.
Despite differences in how the confrontation with each religious group
unfolded, a key reason for the opposing reactions by Japan and the United
States is Japan's relatively new constitutional tolerance of religion which
stands in contrast to the United States' long history of religious protectionism.
Additionally, the governments of both countries appear to be making efforts
to respond to what their people find important. For the Japanese, the rights of
the community predominate over the freedoms of the individual; however,
citizens of the United States generally hold individual rights supreme. In light
of this, the Japanese legislature must ask itself whether the government has
gone too far in its containment of Awn Shinriky6's activities. The question
for the United States is whether the government has gone far enough. The
United States Congress and state legislatures must consider the extent to which
they are willing to take the power of the First Amendment. A final question
to consider is whether it would take an Aum-like scenario in the United States
for Congress to begin to retract those individual rights.
